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Viewing cable 09TBILISI1034, GEORGIA: RUSSIA MOVES IN ON ABKHAZ ECONOMY \

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the <u>structure of a cable</u> as well as how to <u>discuss them</u> with others. See also the <u>FAOs</u>

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (<u>browse by origin</u> to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09TBILISI1034**.

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 09TBILISI1034 2009-06-05 09:07 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tbilisi

Appears in these articles:

http://www.letemps.ch/swiss papers

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VZCZCXRO1339
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #1034/01 1560907
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 050907Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1666
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0231
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2278
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4849
2009-06-05 09:07:00 09TBILISI1034 Embassy Tbilisi CONFIDENTIAL 08TBILISI2071 VZCZCXRO1339\
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR\
DE RUEHSI #1034/01 1560907\
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1666\
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
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RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY\
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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY\
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2278\
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4849 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001034 \
SIPDIS \
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC \
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019 \
TAGS: ECON EPET PREL KBTS RS TU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIA MOVES IN ON ABKHAZ ECONOMY \
REF: 08 TBILISI 2071 \
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). \
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\underline{\P}1. (C) Summary and comment. Recent moves suggest an \setminus
increasing Russian interest in exploiting economic \
opportunities in Abkhazia. The Georgian Law on Occupied \
Territories stipulates that all business in Abkhazia be \
conducted pursuant to existing Georgian regulations (reftel), \
but Russian entities apparently believe their government's
recognition of Abkhazia renders the law inoperative. Rosneft \
secured the rights to explore Abkhaz oil resources, and the \
Russian government has offered millions in loans to Abkhazia \
-- loans that could benefit such companies as Russian \
Railways. Russia plans to help manage the Abkhaz airport -- \
a move that will likely draw Abkhazia closer into Russia's \Olympic preparations. In an illuminating counterexample, \
Benetton Turkey proposed opening a store in Sukhumi, but \ following vocal protests from the Georgian government and \
Benetton's own Georgian stores, apparently backed down.
Georgian government believes highly placed Russians, \
including Prime Minister Putin, stand to benefit directly \
from these deals and is considering its options for a \
response. End summary and comment. \
Rosneft and Abkhaz Oil \
\underline{\  \  } 2. (SBU) On May 26, the Russian state-owned Rosneft \ reportedly signed a five-year deal to acquire the rights to \ explore for oil and natural gas off Abkhazia's Black Sea \
         Estimates of the recoverable offshore oil reserves
near Abkhazia range from 80 to 200 million tons. Financial \
details of the agreement have not been released. In 2005, \
the Abkhaz rejected a bid by LUKOil to develop these same \
offshore reserves. The key area for exploration is the \
Abkhaz Black Sea coast. Rosneft plans to build a string of \
gas stations in Abkhazia and sell gasoline, diesel, and \
heating oil. In response, Minister of Economic Development \Lasha Zhvania issued a public statement, saying, "Any \commercial activity of any organization in Abkhazia without \
the permission of the central Georgian government is illegal." \
Russian Loans and Abkhaz Infrastructure \
13. (SBU) On May 14, Abkhaz de facto "president" Sergey
Bagapsh announced in Sochi, Russia that Abkhazia asked Russia \
for a long-term loan, worth approximately USD 31-47 million.
Prime Minister Putin reportedly agreed to the long-term \
repayment structure. Bagapsh was quoted as saying the funds \
would be allocated for the "development of the Abkhaz banking \
system and the capitalization of the National Bank in order \
to finance small and medium business in the republic."
funds will reportedly go toward the construction of a \
railway, apparently in cooperation with Russian Railways, \
which Bagapsh claimed was critical for the transportation of \
cargo to the facilities for the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi. \
He added that he is not aware of the role Abkhazia will play \
in the construction itself, but he knows that Turkey is
prepared to take Abkhaz construction materials. Russia will \
also reportedly be involved in the management of the Sukhumi \
airport. \
Benetton in Sukhumi \
14. (SBU) On May 26, four Benetton stores in Tbilisi closed \
their doors to protest the announced intention of Benetton \
Turkey to open a branch in Sukhumi. Large signs appeared in \QTurkey to open a branch in Sukhumi. Large signs appeared in \
the stores' windows, reading "Shop closed in protest of the \opening of a Benetton shop in Sukhumi." Government \
representatives reacted swiftly: Economic Development \
Minister Zhvania publicly condemned the move as again being \outside the requirements of the Law on Occupied Territories. Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze told the press he did not \
oppose the idea of commercial firms conducting business in \
the occupied territories, but insisted that such actions be \
in line with Georgian law (which would require registration, \
tax identification codes, and payment of taxes to Tbilisi) \ and have the explicit permission of the Georgian government. \
He went on to suggest that any violation would be met with \ legal and commercial consequences. According to the Turkish \
Embassy in Tbilisi, the Foreign Minister also called in the \Turkish Charge to make a formal complaint about the move. \
Although Zhvania was reportedly scheduled to meet with \
Benetton representatives to discuss the issue, on May 28 \
TBILISI 00001034 002 OF 002 \
Benetton Turkey released a statement saying that it no longer \
planned to open a store in Sukhumi. \
The Government Prepares to Respond \
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15. (C) In a May 28 conversation with the Ambassador, Vashadze \said that Russia made a "big mistake" in entering the Abkhaz \market with Rosneft and Russian Railways, which he \characterized as 100 percent state-owned. He noted that \LUKOil's Alekperov had approached President Saakashvili \several times in the past about offshore drilling and that \Saakashvili had always objected until Georgia reclaimed \control over the Abkhaz territory. Alekperov did not pursue \the matter further. Vashadze said that the government is \currently investigating its legal options and, once they were \clear, would allocate the appropriate resources and go on the \attack. He also noted that Rosneft is part of what he called \"Kremlin, Inc," as the Swiss company Gunvor -- in which Putin \has a stake -- holds significant ownership. \
\COMMENT \
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16. (C) Abkhaz opposition parties have recently publicly \ criticized Bagapsh's regime for giving away too much of the \ country to Russia -- and those reports came before the $\$ Rosneft announcement (septel). Of course, investments such \ as Rosneft's could ultimately benefit Abkhazia, but the \ self-declared republic will have little leverage to negotiate \ reasonable terms. Judging by anecdotal evidence, the Abkhaz \ are increasingly nervous about the growing influence of \ Russia's economic might in Abkhazia. The question is to what \ extent the Abkhaz will be willing to tolerate Russian \ economic domination before they start seeking alternate \ partners in earnest. It is likely that realization will come \ too late. The Georgian government understands this and hopes \ to erect legal obstacles to the activities. State-affiliated \ Russian companies seem willing so far to brave the potential \ complications -- but both LUKOil (with its international \ structure that is vulnerable to legal challenges in \ international courts) and Benetton realized that the market \ might be more trouble than it's worth. Nevertheless, even if \ Georgia devises an ingenious strategy to pursue damages $\$ against Russian companies or their government, it will likely need help from its international partners to implement such a \ strategy. \ TEFFT \